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Israel and the Arab Uprisings: A Provisional Analysis 
The Arab uprisings engulfing the Middle East since January 2011 have already 
made a significant mark. The former rulers of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen have 
been ousted, Syria has been plunged into bloody civil war, whilst Bahrain has 
witnessed unprecedented clashes between the government and opposition groups. 
However, if history tells us anything it is that it is too early to draw firm conclusions 
about the longer term effects of the Arab uprisings in the Middle East. The future 
trajectory of Egypt under the rule of President Morsi is far from clear. Whether or not 
the Assad regime will fall is uncertain. And will the Arab monarchies face the popular 
challenges endured by Arab republics? Notwithstanding these uncertainties, in my 
view, a provisional analysis, following almost two years of the Arab uprisings, is 
warranted - not least to try better to understand the significance of contemporary 
events and what might be the response from the international community and 
individual countries in the region. One of these countries is Israel, which, despite the 
significant implications of the Arab uprisings for its foreign and security policies, has 
been uncharacteristically quiet amid these momentous events. What follows is an 
attempt to offer a preliminary assessment of the significance and implications of the 
Arab uprisings for Israeli foreign policy and security.  
 
Israel’s security environment amid the Arab uprisings  
When assessing the implications of the Arab uprisings for Israel’s security 
environment it is useful to make a distinction between basic security and day-to-day 
security in Israel. The former refers to the possibility of a full scale attack by a hostile 
state or coalition of states that might imperil Israel’s existence. The latter refers to 
‘provocations, hostile acts along the brooders, and minor incursions into Israel by 
civilians and irregular forces’.1 At the time of writing the most significant impacts on 
Israeli basic security emanate not from the Arab uprisings, but from the potential rise 
of Iran as a nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has 
voiced its concerns about ‘undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military 
                                                          
1
 OŶ the teƌŵs ͚ďasiĐ seĐuƌitǇ͛ aŶd ͚daǇ-to-daǇ seĐuƌitǇ͛ see Aǀi Shlaiŵ, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab 
World (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 81. 
2 
 
related organizations’ in Iran’s nuclear programme.2 The unease expressed by the 
IAEA prompted the US (which has been imposing sanctions on Iran since 1979) and 
the European Union (EU) to impose a ban on the import of Iranian crude oil and to 
freeze the assets of Iran's central bank.3 These measures, which constitute broader 
and stricter sanctions than in the past, suggest that the US and the EU have aligned 
with the assessment that Iran’s nuclear programme has reached threatening military 
dimensions.  
 
The response of Israel and the international community to the development of Iran’s 
nuclear programme is the key factor currently shaping Israel’s basic security. At the 
time of writing it is difficult to say how Israel eventually will respond to the Iranian 
challenge; views in Israeli foreign policy-making circles vary significantly. At one end 
extreme are Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Barak, who have 
argued consistently that ‘all options to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons 
should remain on the table’.4 However, their opinion is opposed by the former heads 
of Mossad and the Israeli Internal Security Services, who argue that Israel should not 
go it alone, and by Israeli President, Shimon Peres, who contends that Israel should 
not attack Iran without the approval and support of the US.5  
Another trend that affects Israel’s basic security is the relative decline in the global 
power of the US. Following the end of the Cold War the US emerged as the sole 
world superpower. Its ability to assemble an international coalition to oust Iraqi forces 
following their invasion of Kuwait strongly reflected the unipolar moment enjoyed by 
the US. By dint of its being Israel’s closest ally, the undisputed position of the US 
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also had an empowering effect on Israel, particularly given the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, which, during the Cold War, had backed a number of Israel’s foes. However, 
in light of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continuing global financial crisis, 
US global power seems in decline. This is evidenced strongly in the relatively minor 
role of the US since the Arab uprisings erupted.  
 
Hence, the coincidence of decline in US power (even if temporary), and the rise of 
Iran as a potential nuclear power, are the key trends affecting current Israeli basic 
security. In contrast, the aftermath of the Arab uprisings seems not to be threatening 
Israeli basic security, particularly since repeated statements from the recently 
elected Egyptian President, Mohammed Morsi, that Egypt will respect its 
international agreements, including the Camp David peace agreement with Israel.6 
These would seem not to be empty declarations since Egypt’s economic solvency is 
largely dependent on continued peace with Israel. The essential income from 
tourism, levies from the Suez canal, $1.3 billion annual military aid from the US, 
loans from organizations dominated by the US (such as the International Monetary 
Fund) would all be severely interrupted, should Egypt revoke the Camp David 
agreements or engage in conflict with Israel. Given this compelling economic vested 
interest in maintaining the peace agreement with Israel, it is unlikely that, in the short 
term, Egypt would emerge as a threat to Israel’s basic security by engaging in 
conflict. 
 
Similarly, there has been unease that the new Egyptian administration under 
President Morsi will adopt what he (Morsi) has referred to as a more ‘balanced’ 
foreign policy, which would entail becoming a closer ally of Iran. 7  However, so far 
these concerns have not materialized. Although Morsi is the first Egyptian President 
in three decades to visit Iran - to attend the summit of non-alignment countries - his 
conference speech highlighted some of the disagreements between the two 
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countries. For example, whilst Iran supports the current regime in Syria, President 
Morsi depicted Assad’s administration as ‘an oppressive regime which has lost 
legitimacy’, continuing that, ‘supporting the Syrian uprising, was not only an ethical 
duty but also a political and strategic necessity’. Morsi also did not offer support for 
Iran’s nuclear programme, but rather restated the traditional Egyptian position that 
the Middle East should be a nuclear-free zone.8 
 
However, this does not mean that the Arab uprisings are having no effect on Israeli 
security. In particular, the change of guard in Egypt has significant implications for 
Israel’s day-to-day security. To understand the nature of this shift it is worth reflecting 
briefly on the relations forged by the Mubarak regime prior to its ousting, and by 
Israeli governments - especially since 2003-4. Elucidating the nature of past relations 
will help ascertain the significance of the change of guard in Egypt and its impact on 
Israeli day-to-day security.  
 
In some respects the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement was always a ‘cold peace’. 
For example, in terms of ‘normalization’ of the relations between the two countries, 
the peace agreement never ‘warmed up’. Also, Israel from time to time accused 
Egypt of ‘not doing enough’ to stop weapons being smuggled by Hamas through the 
networks of tunnels running beneath the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. 
Nonetheless, there was a noticeable rise in the level of security and foreign policy 
cooperation between Israel and Egypt during the last six or seven years of the 
Mubarak regime. For instance, Israel tightly coordinated its 2005 unilateral 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip with the Egyptians,9 and during the 2006 Israeli-
Hezbollah war, Egypt expressed its support for Israel not Hezbollah.10 Likewise, the 
cooperation between Israel and Egypt against Hezbollah was manifested when, in 
2008, a Hezbollah ring, which supposedly tried to overthrow President Mubarak, was 
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exposed by the Egyptian security services.11 Most remarkable, however, has been 
Egyptian and Israeli cooperation in imposing the siege on the Gaza Strip, particularly 
after Hamas took control of the Strip militarily in July 2007. Even during Israel’s 
onslaught on the Gaza Strip during operation Cast Lead (December-January 2008-
2009), Egypt refrained from lifting the siege.12  
 
The ousting of President Mubarak, his close advisors, and the recent dismissal of the 
top guard of the Egyptian military, which was intrinsic to the Israeli-Egyptian political 
and security cooperation in the past, suggests that the foreign policy-making circle in 
Egypt is undergoing change. Even if the new policy-makers adhere to the peace 
agreement, it is unlikely that the Israeli government can maintain the type of 
cooperation it had with Egypt during the last years of the Mubarak regime. Crucially, 
Israel would find it difficult to count on (tacit) Egyptian support of its policy towards 
Hamas, which is an off-shoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It is more likely 
that the current Egyptian regime’s policy and actions towards the Palestinians will 
reflect more strongly than the Mubarak regime the deep antagonism expressed by 
the Egyptian public towards Israel and its policy vis-a-vis the Palestinians. Under 
these circumstances, the foreign policy options available to Israel to respond to the 
political and military challenge posed by Hamas might become more limited. For 
example, it is unlikely that Israel could launch an onslaught similar to operation Cast 
Lead and expect the current Egyptian regime to remain on the sidelines or even lend 
tacit support to Israel.  
 
The change of guard in Egypt, however, does not only affect the ability of Israel to 
respond to the challenges posed to its day-to-day security from the Gaza Strip, 
which is under the control of Hamas. Israeli-Egyptian relations in the post Mubarak 
era have a direct bearing also on the security threats emanating from the Sinai 
Peninsula such as weapons smuggling, mortar attacks, the launch of Grad missiles, 
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and cross border terrorist attacks by armed groups.13 As shown by recent attacks 
launched from Sinai, Israel’s ability to react is conditioned by the complex relations 
between Israel and Egypt in the post Mubarak era.  
 
The rise of political Islam: Challenge or opportunity?  
The aftermath of the Arab uprisings is important not only in terms of the implications 
for Israeli day-to-day security but also for its crystallization of the rise of political 
Islamists to achieve positions of power in a number of countries in the Arab Middle 
East. This trend is most visible in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists 
won a majority in the Egyptian Parliament14 and Mohammed Morsi, supported by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, won the Presidential elections. The rise of political Islamists to 
power in Egypt is likely to reinforce the positions held by political Islamists in Tunisia, 
and Palestine (since 2006), and provide a tail wind for Islamists vying for positions of 
power elsewhere, e.g. in Syria.  
 
Conventional wisdom in Israel since the end of the Cold War is that the rise of 
political Islamic groups to positions of power is detrimental to Israeli security and 
foreign policy.15 It is against this backdrop that Prime Minister Netanyahu, in a public 
speech to the Israeli Parliament, commented that the Arab Spring is an 'Islamic, anti-
Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli and anti-democratic wave.'16 The fusion of politics 
and religion, it is reasoned, has produced an ideological standpoint that indisposes 
political Islamists to enter into a political dialogue with Israel, let alone end the Arab-
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Israeli conflict, on a basis of a land-for-peace compromise. In this context, Israeli 
policy-makers usually refer to the Hamas covenant, which, besides calling for Israel’s 
destruction, forbids ‘Palestine’s’ use as collateral in the context of a peace deal:  
The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated 
for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, 
or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither 
any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be 
they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that. Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land consecrated 
for Moslem generations until Judgement Day.17 
 
In addition to being staunch political rivals political Islamic groups have proven 
formidable military opponents. The resistance campaign of Hezbollah resulted in 
Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and, a few years later, during the 
2006 Second Lebanon War, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) was unable to defeat 
Hezbollah. Hamas has also emerged as a tough adversary, using kidnappings, 
suicide bombings and mortar and rocket attacks, in its confrontations with Israel. The 
record of political Islamic non-state actors raises the concern that should the Arab 
uprisings produce states that were controlled by political Islamists, movements such 
as Hamas and Hezbollah would receive greater support. Worse still from an Israeli 
perspective, an anti-Israeli pan-Islamic coalition of states could emerge. Such a 
scenario would certainly pose a grave political and military challenge to Israel.  
 
However, the aftermath of the Arab uprisings suggest that this troubling scenario is 
not a foregone conclusion. In fact, the rise of political Islamists to power might be a 
unique opportunity. In this context, the key state would be Egypt. If Israel and Egypt 
were to succeed in maintaining the peace agreement, it would provide to the Camp 
David accords a stamp of legitimacy that would have been impossible under the 
dictatorial rule of Hosni Mubarak. Consequently, it would be politically more feasible 
than in the past for a movement such as Hamas, should it wish to do so, to change 
its current stance of opposing the Quartet’s demands – to renounce violence, 
recognize Israel, and respect previously signed agreements between Israel and the 
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Palestinian Authority. Likewise, maintaining the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement 
would demonstrate to Israelis that it is possible to conduct relationships based on 
peaceful co-existence with political Islamists. From this vantage point, safeguarding 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement would be of paramount importance not only for 
improving Israeli day-to-day security and avoiding confrontation with Egypt but also 
for creating the conditions for fruitful political dialogue between Israel and the new 
elites that have risen to power since the onset of the Arab uprisings.  
 
The uncertainty effect 
 
A historical process of the magnitude of the Arab uprisings inevitably involves a huge 
degree of uncertainty. Judged by the previous wave of Arab uprisings that began 
with the 1952 Egyptian revolution, it could take more than a decade for the political 
and military trends prompted by the event to become clear. For instance, in 1956 the 
then Egyptian President, Gammal Abdel Nasser, and the notion of pan-Arabism, 
emerged politically victorious following the ousting of the British from Egypt after the  
Suez War. However, just over ten years later the Dream Palace of the Arabs, to 
paraphrase Fouad Ajami, came tumbling down following Israel’s victory in the 1967 
War.  
 
Two years into the current Arab uprisings similar uncertainty prevails. From an Israeli 
point of view some uncertainties loom larger than others. One is over the situation in 
Syria, which under the Assads has been Iran’s key Arab ally, supported Hezbollah 
and Hamas and, following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, continued to be 
the key Arab promoter of the notion of a pan-Arab struggle against Israel, albeit with 
very limited success. Thus, the outcome of the current civil war in Syria will have 
significant implications for Israeli foreign policy and security: from the ability to 
control the arsenal of Syria’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, through the future 
prospects of the alliance with Iran (which is supporting the Assad regime), to a 
potential peace agreement between Israel and a post-conflict Syria. Another 
unknown is Jordan, which is significant for Israeli foreign policy and security in a 
number of ways. To begin with, Israel’s longest territorial border is with Jordan. In 
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addition, since the establishment of the State of Israel it has engaged in covert 
political and security cooperation with Jordan, which, after Egypt, was the second 
Arab country to sign a peace agreement with Israel in 1994. The overt and covert 
cooperation between Israel and Jordan emanated from the common perception 
among the Israelis and the Hashemite Monarchy that rules Jordan, of the 
Palestinians being a potential threat.18 At the time of writing Jordan has not 
experienced the kind of uprisings that neighbouring Arab republics have witnessed. 
However, does this mean that Jordan and the ruling Hashemite Monarchy are 
immune from a similar fate?  
 
The profound uncertainties entailed by the Arab uprisings have resulted in the Israeli 
government’s adopting a ‘wait and see’ policy. In an important speech to the Israeli 
parliament, the Knesset, Prime Minister Netanyahu explained the logic behind this 
position:  
Israel is facing a period of instability and uncertainty in the region. This is certainly 
not the time to listen to those who say follow your heart … I remember many of you 
urged me to seize the opportunity to make hasty concessions, to rush to an 
agreement. 
We can't know who will end up with any piece of territory we give up. Reality is 
changing all the time, and if you don't see it, your head is buried in the sand.19 
The Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which was stalled with the rise of Binyamin 
Netanyahu to power in May 2009, has now come to a complete halt as a result of the 
‘wait and see policy’. Ostensibly, this stance might seem prudent. However, deeper 
reflection suggests it is extremely risky. To understand the risks it is useful to reflect 
on the September 1993 Israeli decision to officially launch the Oslo Process following 
several months of behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO).  
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The initiation of Oslo involved recognizing the PLO, and placing political dialogue 
with the organization at the centre of Israeli policy towards it. Thus, it marked a 
departure from Israel’s previous foreign policy stance of non-recognition, and 
attempts to defeat the PLO - militarily and politically. The Israeli decision to pursue 
this dramatic foreign policy shift was informed by the perceptions of the then Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and his Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, that Israel 
was in an unprecedentedly strong strategic position.20 The Cold War ended with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, which had backed several of Israel’s foes, such as 
Syria and to a lesser extent the PLO, and the emergence of the US, Israel’s closest 
ally, as the world’s super power. The expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by a US-
led coalition in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, and the ensuing imposition of dual 
containment on Iran and Iraq, also significantly diminished the possibility of an 
invasion of Israel from the east, by a coalition of Arab armies. The positive effects of 
these international and regional trends, argued Rabin and Peres, were compounded 
by Israel’s increasing state capacity. The successful process of economic 
restructuring in the mid 1980s, followed by an influx of Jews emigrating from the 
former USSR, buttressed the political, economic, social and military foundations of 
Israeli power.  
 
However, Rabin and Peres pointed to three counter-trends which were rendering 
Israel’s strategic position rather tenuous. One was the emergence of political Islam 
as the most powerful stream in Arab politics, which was giving rise to political elites 
less disposed than their Arab secular counterpart to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict 
through political dialogue. Another was the prospect of the Middle East entering a 
nuclear race, ending the Israeli Defence Force’s military supremacy in the region and 
potentially posing an existential threat to Israel—a country small enough to be wiped 
out by one nuclear device. The third trend was the potential long-term weakening of 
Israeli state capacity due to the increasingly adverse demographic imbalance 
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between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. Were the Israeli occupation to remain in 
place, Palestinians eventually would outnumber Israeli Jews, ending the ability of 
Israel to exist as a Jewish and a democratic state. Rabin and Peres believed that the 
way to deal with these multiple challenges effectively was to end the Arab-Israeli 
conflict through a peace settlement with the PLO. The alternative would mean 
dealing with conflict with the Arabs and a potentially nuclear Middle East, from a 
weakened position.  
 
The immediate aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the advances in Iran’s nuclear 
programme, and the waning (even if temporary) of US power seem to be vindication 
of Rabin’s and Peres’s predictions. Recent data21 obtained by leading experts 
suggest that Rabin and Peres were also correct in their assessment of the negative 
implications of the demographic trends between Israeli Jews and Palestinians for the 
ability to maintain Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state. Currently, Israeli Jews 
constitute a minority in the area between the river Jordan and the Mediterranean 
Sea. Moreover, settlement expansions, which are a key obstacle to an eventual 
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, increased in 2011, further weakening the 
already tenuous prospects of a two-state solution.22 Thus, whilst the wait and see 
policy might appear prudent in the short term, it runs the risk in the long run of 
exacerbating the existing threats to Israel’s security environment and putting it in a 
weaker position to deal with future challenges.23 
 
                                                          
21
 The figures include the Gaza Strip, which was evacuated by Israel in 2005, foreign workers, illegal 
immigrants, and non-Halachically Jewish immigrants to Israel. See interview with Professor Sergio Dellla 
Peƌgola, ͚Jeǁs Ŷoǁ a ŵiŶoƌitǇ ďetǁeeŶ the ƌiǀeƌ aŶd the sea, 
http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=196877, Arnon Sopher, Jewish population in Israel 
declining, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/jewish-population-in-israel-is-declining-1.317042, 
both links accessed 29 August 2012.  
22
 For an updated report see ͚ToƌpedoiŶg the tǁo state solutioŶ: SuŵŵaƌǇ of ϮϬϭϭ iŶ the SettleŵeŶts͛, Peace 
Now, http://peacenow.org.il/eng/2011Summary, accessed 7 September 2012.  
23
 These figures include the Gaza Strip, which was evacuated by Israel in 2005, foreign workers, illegal 
immigrants, and non-Halachically Jewish immigrants to Israel. See interview with Professor Sergio Dellla 
Peƌgola, ͚Jeǁs Ŷoǁ a ŵiŶoƌitǇ ďetǁeeŶ the  ƌiǀeƌ aŶd the sea, 
http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=196877, Arnon Sopher, Jewish population in Israel 
declining, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/jewish-population-in-israel-is-declining-1.317042, 
both links accessed 29 August 2012.  
 
12 
 
Conclusion 
The Arab uprisings are part of a dramatic historical process that is still in motion. 
However, their impact on Israel is linked to broader trends in the Middle East since 
the end of the Cold War, e.g. the waning (if temporary) of US power, the rise of 
political Islam, the potential nuclearization of the Middle East, demographic trends 
affecting the balance between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians in the area once 
considered Mandatory Palestine. In this context, the repercussions of the Arab 
uprisings seem to be having two clear effects. One concerns the ability of Israel to 
respond to challenges to its day-to-day security, which seems to have been reduced 
by the change of guard in Egypt since the ousting of President Mubarak. Even if the 
current Egyptian administration keeps intact the Camp David agreement, Israel 
cannot count on the same level of political and security cooperation with Egypt as in 
the last years of the Mubarak regime.  
 
The second effect is the rise to power of political Islamists, which for Israel poses a 
challenge and an opportunity. Should Israel and political Islamists stick to their 
current political positions and continue their armed conflict, this would impact 
negatively on the ability of both sides to achieve peace. However, were Israel and 
Egypt in particular to succeed in maintaining the peace agreement between them, 
this might make it more feasible for Israel and other political Islamists (e.g. Hamas) 
to engage in dialogue. However, for this to happen the Israeli government would 
have to abandon its ‘wait and see’ policy adopted amid the profound uncertainties 
generated by the Arab uprisings, e.g. in Syria and Jordan. This would entail a risk 
but also provide an opportunity to break the mould with Israel’s erstwhile enemies 
and, hence, make a significant contribution to the shaping of a peaceful international 
order in the Middle East affording freedom, justice and dignity to Israelis and 
Palestinians alike.   
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